Proposition 1A: Safe, Reliable High-Speed Passenger Train Bond Act. - recommend No
Update: Look to the comments for an ongoing debate about the pros and cons of this proposition. I am going to stay with my "No" recommendation.
As the legislative analyst's summary tells us, the state of California created the California High-Speed Rail Authority in 1996 to set up an intercity, 200+ mph rail system linking the major metropolitan areas of California, with a first goal of linking northern and southern California.
Delving into the actual text of the proposed legislation, we find a bond measure that would take out $9.95 billion in bonds (thanks to commentor Rafael for catching my error here), at an estimated cost of $19.4 billion over thirty years, to fund the development of high-speed rail and upgrades to local rail to link the two systems together. Specifically, the funding is broken down like so:
$950 million is dedicated to that second task, of funding "capital improvements to intercity and commuter rail lines and urban rail systems" to connect them to the projected high-speed rail system. $190 million of this goes to the state Department of Transportation, with the remainder going to local transit agencies. This latter portion comes with strings attached, namely that the local transit agency has to provide matching funds, and that it can't reduce its spending below its average spending across the 1998-2001 period. I have no idea why that period was chosen, but there you go.
The remaining roughly $9 billion (fixed, per above) goes to building the high-speed rail system itself. The assigned goal for this money is to first complete a rail line from San Francisco to Los Angeles, and then fill in routes linking Oakland and San Jose, Sacramento and Merced, Los Angeles and the Inland Empire, The Inland Empire and San Diego, and Los Angeles and Irvine. This money also comes with some strings attached. First, it can't be used for the operating costs of the rail system -- just construction. Second, it can only be used for half of those construction costs, with the other half to be acquired some other way, "including, but not limited to, federal funds, funds from revenue bonds, and local funds."
That last bit might give you some pause. What happens if the other half can't be found anywhere? Hard to say.
It's nearly impossible to evaluate something like this in free space. With that in mind, we might want to take a look at two recently created high-speed rail systems, those of Korea and Taiwan.
The Korean high-speed rail system, the KTX, connects Seoul to Daegu and to Mokpo via a branched system. Currently, it represents about 200 miles of track, not all of it fully enabled to be high speed. Although it was initially costed at about $5 billion, the system to date has ended up costing about $18 billion to build, taking 12 years to start operation. It initially had ridership issues, but that has picked up, with a concomitant drop in air and road travel. The system itself has generated $3 billion in income since its opening.
The Taiwanese high speed rail system just started operation in 2007, after about 7 years of construction. Also covering about 200 miles of track, this system has come in at about $15 billion so far. As it just opened last year, there's obviously not much to say about ridership, although there have been some concerns about production quality.
The California High-Speed Rail Authority estimated the cost to build the full California rail system at $45 billion -- so obviously they don't think they're going to cover it all in one go right now, with only $9 billion in state money and a presumptive $9 billion in matching funds from somewhere. Is $45 billion a reasonable number?
Consider that the Korean and Taiwanese systems both clocked in around the $15-18 billion range to cover 200 miles of tracks. Consider also that the San Francisco to Los Angeles line alone is 381 miles. The remaining proposed routes add another 350 miles of track, for a grand total of about 730 miles of track. If we presume to extrapolate from the Korean and Taiwanese experiences, we're looking at $54-65 billion for the full system, and $28-34 billion for the SF to LA route.
If we presume the full matching funds, it's looking suspiciously like Prop 1A will only get us from San Francisco to Paso Robles. As nice as Paso Robles is, it's only halfway to Los Angeles.
I think the imbalance between the available funds and the likely costs ultimately makes this impractical right now, especially funding it via a bond measure.
So who's putting money into the effort for or against this proposition? Well, as it happens, there are no groups putting money up against it. Major groups contributing money in support of Prop 1A include the Members Voice of the State Building Trades ($50,000), the California American Council of Engineering Companies Issues Fund ($25,000), the California Alliance for Jobs Rebuild California Committee ($200,000, and sporting a cumbersome name), the Association of California High Speed Trains ($24,000), and the Californians for Safe & Reliable High Speed Rail ($54,000). A number of architecture, construction, and engineering firms also contributed in the tens of thousands of dollars range. Contributors there include companies like HDR, HNTB, Systra, Alstom, Hatch Mott MacDonald, and Parsons Brinckerhoff Americas. Nothing especially shocking in either set of contributors.
You can read the full list of people putting money into supporting Prop 1A here.
You can read the full text of Prop 1A here.
You can read my reviews and recommendations for the other propositions by clicking here.
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