GAO: All the waste uranium may be worth something again
In a report titled Nuclear Material: DOE Has Several Potential Options for Dealing with Depleted Uranium Tails, Each of Which Could Benefit the Government, the GAO takes a look at how shifting conditions in energy markets may have transformed a giant stockpile of radioactive waste into a viable source for fuel.
The last century has demonstrated that fuel resources are not just subject to absolute limits, like finally running out of oil, but also to price pressures. Fifty years ago, it did not make economic sense to attempt to recover oil from tar sands, but these days, as easier reserves are depleted, companies are willing to pay a higher price for extraction in turn for continued supply. Similar price point issues affect the adoption of cleaner technologies such as solar and wind power. In this report, the GAO addresses how a substantial increase in the price of uranium may make it worthwhile for the Department of Energy to revisit its uranium tails, previously considered purely a waste product.
Only a very small portion of natural uranium is usable as fuel. The uranium enrichment process, used to make fissionable nuclear materials for fuel or weapons, involves separating the relatively rare uranium-235 isotopes away from their far more common uranium-238 brethren. At the end of this process, you're left with some uranium-235 to use as fuel, and some uranium-238...that still has a remnant of uranium-235 left in it that was simply too expensive to extract. This is known as a uranium tail (think of mine tailings), and although it is substantially depleted of fissionable material, it is still radioactive and toxic.
DOE currently has 700,000 tons of uranium tails.
Times, and markets, however, have changed. Eight years ago, a kilogram of uranium went for $21. Today, that same kilogram goes for $200, or basically ten times as much. As a consequence, the costs involved in extracting those extra last bits of u-235, much like the costs of extracting oil from tar sands, are now reasonable.
GAO looked at three options for DOE's handling of uranium tails. DOE could simply sell the tails and let others enrich them, DOE could enrich the tails themselves and sell the enriched product, or DOE could just sit on them and do nothing.
Briefly, the first option appears to be out (for now) because of legislation from 1996 that prevents the sale of depleted uranium. Simple as that. If Congress changed the law to allow such sales, then GAO projects that DOE would have to offer the uranium at a significant discount, to account for the financial risk the end purchaser would be taking on, based on that purchaser's need to refine the stuff.
The second option offers tremendous value -- markets and capacity depending. Based on prices at the time of the report, GAO estimated that DOE's current stock of uranium tails had a net value of $7.6 billion. That would fund quite a bit of basic energy research at DOE. Of course, this depends on the market remaining stable, and uranium prices have pitched down 40% in the last few months. That said, if prices fluctuate upward within a reasonable range, the DOE tails could be worth about $20 billion. The second issue is one of capacity. The available refining capacity in the United States is mostly spoken for, as we are in a bit of a lull in terms of capacity (with older factories going offline and newer ones not coming online for several years yet). This means that enrichment would necessarily be slow, which in turn gives the market more time to go in the wrong direction.
The "sit on them" option is problematic because it requires conversion of the tails into a form that will need to be reconverted again if DOE ever changes its mind and decides to enrich them. This adds an additional layer of cost to any eventual enrichment effort.
GAO notes that DOE has been slow about putting together a promised handling plan for the tails, and that this slowness means they have been unable to react to changing market conditions.
The report ends on this recommendation:
To determine the best options available for DOE's tails, the Secretary of Energy should complete the development of a comprehensive uranium management assessment as soon as possible. The assessment should contain detailed information on the types and quantities of depleted, natural, and enriched uranium the department currently manages and a comprehensive assessment of DOE's options for this material, including the department's authority to implement these options. Furthermore, the assessment should analyze the impact of each of these options on the domestic uranium industry and provide details on how implementation of any of these options should be adjusted in the event that market conditions change.


