Last month, the GAO issued a report titled Securing, Stabilzing, and Rebuilding Iraq: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight. In it, they compare their earlier advice on these efforts in Iraq with what's actually going on (and going wrong) on the ground there. As with almost any GAO report, it's a treasure trove of useful information. As you might expect, it could be succinctly summed up as "there's a lot going wrong in Iraq."
This GAO report touches on a number of key concerns and problems related to Iraq: (1) The cost of the war has been steadily increasing, and may not be accurately reported; (2) Iraqi security forces are ineffective, and their numbers are overreported; (3) Nearly 200,000 small arms issued to Iraqis are unaccounted for; (4) Up to to a third of Interior MInistry employees are "ghosts", their salaries going to someone else; (5) Oil production, both refined and crude, is well below target levels, and up to a third of refined product may be going onto the black market, with some of its proceeds funding insurgents; (6) The failure to secure conventional munitions -- both in 2003 and on an ongoing basis -- continues to lead directly to the deaths of American soldiers and Iraqi civilians.
A full discussion, with quotes, is in the extended.
They open with a critique of the 2005 National Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSVI). The NSVI hits three of the GAO's identified characteristics of an effective national strategy:
- Clear purpose, scope, and methodology
- Detailed discussion of problems, risks, and threats
- Desired goals, objectives, activities, and performance measures
...but it only incompletely covers the other three:
- Delineation of US government roles and responsibilities
- Description of strategy's integration among and with other entities
- Description of future costs and resources needed
They then move on to discuss a number of specific problem areas. As always, direct quotes are in italics.
The rising cost of war
As of September 30, 2006, DOD had reported costs of about $257.5 billion2 for military operations in Iraq. In addition, as of October 2006, about $29 billion had been obligated for Iraqi reconstruction and stabilization efforts. However, problems with the processes for recording and reporting GWOT costs raise concerns that these data may not accurately reflect the true dollar value of war-related costs.
Since 2003, when DOD began Operation Iraqi Freedom, DOD has reported cumulative costs of about $257.5 billion for military operations in Iraq. As shown in figure 1, DOD’s reported costs show a steady increase from about $38.8 billion in fiscal year 2003 to about $83.4 billion in fiscal year 2006.
U.S. military and diplomatic commitments in Iraq will continue for the foreseeable future and are likely to be in the hundreds of billions of dollars. The magnitude of future costs will depend on several direct and indirect variables and, in some cases, decisions that have not been made. DOD’s future costs will likely be affected by the pace and duration of operations, the types of facilities needed to support troops overseas, redeployment plans, and the amount of equipment to be repaired or replaced. Although reducing troops would appear to lower costs, we have seen from previous operations in the Balkans and Kosovo that costs could rise—if, for example, increased numbers of contractors replace military personnel.
The take-home message? Our costs have been rising steadily each year, and pulling the troops out may not lower our costs, unless we choose to completely abandon Iraq and refuse to foot the bill for civilian contractors.
The incapability of Iraqi security forces
From the fall of 2003 through April 2006, MNF-I revised its security transition plan a number of times because the Iraqi government and security forces have proved incapable of assuming security responsibilities within the time frames envisioned by the plans. For example, in October 2003, the multinational force outlined a four-phased plan for transferring security missions to Iraqi security forces (see table 1). Citing the growing capability of Iraqi security forces, MNF-I attempted to quickly shift responsibilities to them in February 2004 but did not succeed in this effort. In Baghdad, for example, the coalition forces withdrew to bases outside of the city, giving Iraqi forces greater responsibility for security within the city. In April 2004, however, Iraqi police and military units performed poorly during an escalation of insurgent attacks against the coalition.2 Many Iraqi security forces around the country collapsed during this uprising, with some units abandoning their posts and responsibilities and in some cases assisting the insurgency. Following the collapse of Iraqi security forces, MNF-I identified a number of problems that contributed to their poor performance, including problems in training and equipping Iraqi forces, and revised its security transition plan.
Here's the afore-mentioned Table 1:
Note that violence has increased fairly dramatically since February of 2006 -- when the attack on the Golden Mosque occurred, as cited in the most recent State of the Union Address. However, that was an increase from a solid 2-3,000 attacks per month. That initial increase in violence dates all the way back to April of 2004. Things got worse starting with the Golden Mosque attack, but they certainly weren't going well before then. Bush views that attack as the cause of all the problems -- or at least presents it as such -- but it could just as well be a symptom.
Also notice that despite a continuous rise in security forces, violence has increased as well. Of course, there's an explanation for the lack of impact of new security forces:
As we previously reported, the number of trained and equipped security forces does not provide a complete picture of their capabilities and may overstate the number of forces on duty.6 Ministry of Interior data include police who are absent without leave, but Ministry of Defense data exclude absent military personnel.
As you may have heard reported elsewhere, the numbers are overestimates -- possibly large ones. Every Iraqi security forces member who thought better of that life, and even possibly some who were kidnapped, still count on the official rolls.
How ready are the units that exist?
DOD provided GAO with classified, aggregate information on overall readiness levels for the Iraqi security forces—including an executive-level brief—and information on units in the lead, but has not provided unit-level reports on Iraqi forces’ capabilities. According to MNF-I’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Strategic Effects, the best measure of the capabilities of Iraqi units and improvements in the security situation comes from commanders on the ground at the lowest level. We previously reported that GAO was working with DOD to obtain the unit-level TRA reports because they would be useful in more fully informing Congress on the capabilities and needs of Iraq’s security forces and in indicating how accurately DOD reports reflect the forces’ capabilities. As of January 2007, DOD still has not provided GAO with this unit-level TRA data.
TRAs are reports filled out by American advisors evaluating the readiness of Iraqi units. You can see an example of the single-page TRA worksheet within the GAO report. Unfortunately, as described above, GAO has only received general estimates, rather than unit-level readiness reports, so they can't double check any claims made about the readiness of Iraqi security forces.
Where are the guns?
However, according to our preliminary analysis, DOD and MNF-I may not be able to account for Iraqi security forces’ receipt of about 90,000 rifles and about 80,000 pistols which were reported as issued before early October 2005.
That's not so good.
Where's the money?
U.S. officials said that the Iraqi ministries have limited capability to manage personnel, and that the Ministry of Interior has limited control of local and provincial police and that loyalty to officials in Baghdad is questionable. For example, the World Bank report states that the Iraqi government pays salaries to nonexistent, or “ghost employees,” that are collected by other officials. According to U.S. officials 20 percent to 30 percent of the Ministry of Interior staff are “ghost employees.”
Unsurpisingly, corruption siphons off a lot of cash in Iraq. And, as this report indicates, it really is cash, because there isn't a coherent banking system in Iraq to support any other form of kind of transaction.
On the other hand, while excess money is going into ghost salaries, very little money is being spent on capital improvements.
As of August 2006, the government of Iraq had spent, on average, 8 percent of its annual capital goods budget and 14 percent of its annual capital projects budget. Iraq’s fiscal year begins on January 1 of each year. Some of the weakest spending occurs at the Ministry of Oil, which relies on damaged and outdated infrastructure to produce the oil that provides nearly all of the country’s revenues (see table 1).
Here's the table:
The Iraqi government is so incoherent that even though it has quite a bit of capital available, very little of it is being spent. This is partially driven by security problems onsite, but according to the GAO, is largely a consequence of the lack of organized procurement in Iraq. So it's not a matter of money being misspent, but rather, not spent at all.
What about that oil?
Iraq’s oil production and exports have consistently fallen below U.S. program goals. U.S. and Iraqi efforts to restore Iraq’s oil sector have been impeded by the lack of security, corruption, sustainability, and funding challenges. The unstable security environment continues to place workers and infrastructure at risk while protection efforts remain insufficient. Widespread corruption and smuggling affect the distribution of refined oil products, such as gasoline. The U.S. reconstruction program has encountered difficulty with Iraq’s ability to operate and maintain aging infrastructure. Further, uncertainties exist regarding the sources of future funding. These challenges could make it difficult to achieve current production and export goals, which are central to Iraq’s government revenues and economic development.
Wolfowitz and other war boosters said that Iraq could fund its own rebuilding with oil exports. As the following table shows, that just isn't going to happen:
Reduced production is most obviously a consequence of poor infrastructure and security, but what about failure to export refined products?
U.S. and international officials note that corruption in Iraq’s oil sector is pervasive. In 2006, the World Bank and Ministry of Oil’s Inspector General estimated that millions of dollars of government revenue is lost each year to oil smuggling or diversion of refined products. According to State Department officials and reports, about 10 percent to 30 percent of refined fuels is diverted to the black market or is smuggled out of Iraq and sold for a profit. According to U.S. Embassy documents, the insurgency has been partly funded by corrupt activities within Iraq and from skimming profits from black marketers.
That's a whopping 10-30% (perhaps as much as a third!) of refined petroleum products hitting the black market, with at least some of that money likely going straight into the insurgency. It's hard to tell exactly how much is legally exported, due to a lack of proper metering equipment:
In addition, Iraq lacks fully functioning meters to measure oil production and exports. In 1996, the United Nations (UN) first cited the lack of oil metering during the time Iraq was under UN sanctions. In addition, in 2004, the International Advisory and Monitoring Board for the Development Fund for Iraq recommended that metering equipment be expeditiously installed. According to the Ministry of Oil and the International Advisory and Monitoring Board (IAMB), an absence of functioning meters precludes control over the distribution and sale of crude and refined products. The U.S. government is currently taking steps to replace old and broken meters at the Al-Basra export terminal, Iraq’s major oil export terminal. This project is scheduled for completion in April 2007.
Given that our rebuilding plan hinged on Iraqi oil paying for it all, it's curious that it took three years from the identification of a key need -- metering equipment in Basra -- until the projected meeting of that need.
IEDs
A fundamental gap existed between OIF war plan assumptions and the experiences of U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq, contributing to an insufficient number of troops on the ground to prevent the widespread looting of conventional munitions storage sites. Looted munitions have emerged as a continuing asymmetric threat to U.S. and coalition forces. The human, strategic, and financial costs of the failure to provide sufficient troops on the ground have been high, since IEDs made from looted explosives have caused about half of all U.S. combat fatalities and casualties in Iraq and have killed hundreds of Iraqis. In addition, unsecured conventional munitions sites have helped sustain insurgent groups and threatened the achievement of the OIF strategic goal of creating a stable Iraqi nation.
DOD’s actions have primarily focused on countering IEDs and not on the security of conventional munitions storage sites as a strategic planning and priority-setting consideration for future operations. Although good first steps, these actions do not address what we believe is a critical OIF lesson learned: If not secured during initial combat operations, an adversary’s conventional munitions storage sites can represent an asymmetric threat to U.S. forces that remain in country.
This speaks for itself.