That empiricism thing
I'm currently reading the Thomas Ricks book, Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq. Among many of those described in its pages who pushed very, very hard for a war in Iraq, Paul Wolfowitz is a real standout. He believed that not only was an attack on Iraq necessary, we would be greeted as liberators, and American troop levels could be dropped to something on the order of 30,000 soldiers within months of the invasion.
I heard a discussion last month in which a speaker said that Wolfowitz would emerge as the "true tragic figure" of the Iraq story, because he (Wolfowitz) honestly believed in what he was doing.
Not so.
A tragic figure not only believes what they're doing, but does their best with what they know at the time.
In contrast, Wolfowitz ignored fact-based thinking and preferred to live in -- to adapt from Rommel -- cloud cuckoo land.
When General Shinseki was called on to develop a speculative plan for an invasion of Iraq, his troop level estimates for post-invasion Iraq were, quite reasonably, based on troop levels that had succeeded in keeping the peace in ethnically torn Bosnia. That was one soldier per fifty people. In Iraq, after ruling out the relatively peaceful Kurdish territories, this would have meant about 300,000 soldiers, or ten times the number Wolfowitz was writing in his dream journal every night.
Called on to testify on likely occupation needs just months before the invasion, Shinseki decided to reach farther back in history and looked at troop levels used in the occupations of postwar Germany and Japan. Based on these levels, the estimate for Iraq was 260,000 soldiers. Once again, much, much higher than what Wolfowitz had in mind.
What did Paul have to say about this?
"Some of the higher end predictions that we have been hearing recently, such as the notion that it will take several hundred thousand U.S. troops to provide stability in post-Saddam Iraq, are wildly off the mark." His reasoning, he explained, was that "it is hard to conceive that it would take more forces to provide stability in post-Saddam Iraq than it would take to conduct the war itself and secure the surrender of Saddam's security forces and his army -- hard to imagine." (from Fiasco, pp. 97-98)
That was it. It was hard, for him, to imagine. Despite the evidence from Bosnia. More importantly, despite the exact same estimates coming from the postwar occupations of Germany and Japan, two ethnically homogenous nations that did not offer widespread partisan resistance after the war. One would imagine that a man who saw such a profound link between World War II and Iraq would have been able to see that, as well.
One might also imagine that a military theorist such as Wolfowitz could see that the U.S. might well induce Iraqi regular army forces to surrender solely by precision-bombing them into paste. Our ability to destroy and demoralize the regular army, and to force the regime into hiding, was never an issue (though even then, the "light and fast" approach pushed by Rumsfeld and Wolfowitz indubitably did more harm than good, even in the initial invasion).
Wolfowitz refused to run the numbers when they got in the way of his imagination. His involvement is a tragedy, but he is no tragic figure. Just a negligent philosopher responsible for widespread chaos and death.